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Reverse Logistics Pricing Strategy for a Green Supply Chain: A View 
of Customers’ Environmental Awareness 
Highlights 
⚫ Reverse logistics of a green supply chain with environmentally-conscious 
customers is addressed. 
⚫ Customer word-of-mouth effect is taken into account. 
⚫ Two different pricing strategies and three game theoretic models have been 
derived and compared. 
⚫ Results indicate customer environmental awareness has positive effects on 
revenues. 
 
Abstract 
The effectiveness of a reverse logistics strategy is contingent upon the successful 
execution of activities related to materials and product reuse. Green supply chain 
(GSC) in reverse logistics aims to minimize byproducts from ending up in landfills. 
This paper considers a retailer responsible for recycling and a manufacturer 
responsible for remanufacturing. Customer environmental awareness (CEA) is 
operationalized as customer word-of-mouth effect. We form three game theoretic 
models for two different scenarios with different pricing strategies, i.e. a 
non-cooperative pricing scenario based on Stackelberg equilibrium and Nash 
equilibrium, and a joint pricing scenario within a cooperative game model. The paper 
suggests that stakeholders are better off making their pricing and manufacturing 
decision in cooperation. 
 
Keywords: Green supply chain, Reverse logistics pricing strategy, Customer 
environmental awareness, Stackelberg equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, Cooperative 
game. 
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1. Introduction 
Enterprises are increasingly favoring investment in a greener SC specifically targeting 
on reverse logistics activities. Green supply chain management (GSCM) aims to 
achieve a win-win situation, balancing the tradeoffs between profit and environmental 
sustainability (Cucchiella et al., 2014; Dubey et al., 2018; Genovese et al., 2017, 2013; 
Govindan et al., 2015; Koh et al., 2013; Sarkis et al., 2011; Zhu et al., 2008; Zhu and 
Sarkis, 2004) This balancing act requires a series of management strategies which 
promote socially sustainable development through environmental protection and 
optimal use of resources (Katiyar et al., 2018). The demand for ‘green branding’ 
which was driven initially by environmental regulation and legislation, has triggered 
the adoption of green techniques in various supply chain management activities 
including product conceptualization and design, materials procurement, production, 
packaging and distribution, as well as end-of-life management of the product (Barari 
et al., 2012). 
Reverse logistics and green product design are GSCM practices that demonstrate 
the firm’s commitment to environmental sustainability (Khor and Udin, 2013; 
Singhry, 2015). Green products are designed to reduce energy consumption, use fewer 
natural resources, increase the ratio of recycled materials, and reduce or eliminate 
toxic substances which are harmful to both the environment and human well being 
(Wee et al., 2011).  
Researchers show a link between environmentally conscious consumers and design 
of green products (Beamon, 1999; Jayaram and Avittathur, 2015). Enterprises 
producing green products intend to project a perception of a strong sense of 
environmental responsibility which is expected to increase demand. Therefore, many 
enterprises regard strategies for producing green products as important policy to 
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improve competitiveness, establish a green corporate image, and achieve sustainable 
development.  
One “greening” strategy involves activities related to re-using of materials collected 
via the reverse logistics chain. The aims are mainly to reduce consumption of 
materials, and reduce total production costs, and thus, increase economic profit to a 
certain acceptable level. For example, Kodak’s and Xerox’s implementation of 
reverse logistics reduced costs and earned them huge gains (Choudhary et al., 2015; 
Pishvaee et al., 2010) while providing ‘environmentally sound’ products within a 
triple bottom line (TBL) framework (Zhao et al., 2012). 
Customers’ increasing environmental awareness is making them more aware of the 
recycling of used products, and this is altering remanufacturing process perspectives. 
In short, customers more dedicated to and aware of “going green” can compel 
enterprises to increase their recovery efforts. Instead of recycling efforts being an 
afterthought, companies increasingly are becoming preemptive and designing 
increasingly modular products allowing greater materials recovery in the reverse 
logistics process. This applies especially to electronic products where the cost of 
removing the electronic components tends to outweigh the cost of replacing the 
circuits. Hence, even the plastic content of the casings are designed for easy removal.  
The coordination among stakeholders is the key to the success of the green supply 
chain management, with game theory as the most popular methodology (c.f. Azevedo 
et al., 2011; Barari et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2010; Chen and Sheu, 2009; Guide et al., 
2000). For example, Maiti and Giri (2017) proposed decentralized (Nash game), 
manufacture-led and retailer-led Stackelberg games, and centralized (cooperative 
game) structures to analyze the two-way product recovery in a two-echelon 
closed-loop supply chain. In terms of reverse logistics pricing strategy, there is a 
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growing body of literature in green supply chain. Among the perspectives covered are 
the pricing of the used products (He, 2015) and refurbished/remanufactured products 
(Gan et al., 2017; Yoo and Kim, 2016). Here, reverse logistics pricing strategy 
involves maximizing the amount of recycling while keeping the price of recycling 
constant or achieving a lower price, while expanding the scale of remanufacturing. 
The objective is to capitalize on CEA to obtain a larger product market share.  
In this paper, we model a case of reverse logistics in a two-tier SC between a 
manufacturer-retailer serving an environmentally conscious customer. The novelty of 
our paper is that it proposes an index to measure the degree of environmental 
consciousness of customers to counterbalance the tradeoff between maximizing the 
profit from reverse logistics, and obtaining an optimal price in the case that retailers 
take responsibility for recovery and manufacturers take responsibility for 
remanufacturing. The paper is organized as follows: section 2 is a brief review of 
existing work in this area, and section 3 models the  GSC’s revenue function taking 
account of each stakeholder’s decision strategy. Section 4 introduces the 
environmentally conscious customer, and pricing strategies for the reverse logistics 
scenarios. Section 5 discusses some of the analytical results and  simulations, and 
offers some insights for managers. Section 6 concludes the study with some 
recommendations for future research. 
2. Literature review 
The literature related to this study can be grouped under work on customers’ 
environmental awareness (CEA) and satisfaction, and reverse logistics and 
remanufacturing SC concepts: 
 
2.1 CEA 
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Building an environmentally friendly product is seen largely as involving a trade off 
with other features, particularly costs. There are two main ways to resolve the 
environmental dilemma, one depends on technological innovation to allow greater 
recovery of materials or a more efficient manufacturing process; the other seeks to 
capitalize on consumers’ choices when greater environmental awareness leads to 
greater demand for eco-friendly purchases (Chan and Lau, 2002; Mainieri et al., 
1997). Companies adopting the latter strategy either hope that customers will be 
willing to pay a premium for a green product, or are worried about consumers’ 
unwillingness to purchase products that appear harmful to the environment (Mohd 
Suki, 2015).  
In China, environmental education programs and environmental campaigns at 
different levels have given exposure to environmental awareness (Wong, 2010). 
However, there has been less emphasis on the interactions among the various 
stakeholders within the SC, and how they affect the relationship between green 
awareness and product sales. For example, Chen (2010) proposed a Nash equilibrium 
model for SC coordination with environmentally-conscious and price-sensitive 
customers; other studies look at product preferences and their effects on the carbon 
footprint (Du et al., 2015), environmentally sensitive customers (Altmann, 2015), and 
environmentally aware consumers (Giri and Bardhan, 2016). Zhang et al. (2013) 
applies game theory to a three-level SC system in which market demand correlates to 
the product’s “greenness”, and Xu and Xie (2016) took the impact of products’ 
eco-friendly level on demand and constructed a two-stage closed-loop supply chain 
composed by a single manufacturer and a single retailer. Ghosh and Shah (2012) build 
game theoretic models to show how greening levels, prices, and profits are influenced 
by channel structures. 
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2.2  Reverse logistics and remanufacturing in the green supply chain 
The complexity of the GSC has increased from being an open-loop SC to being a 
closed-loop SC, from being a single SC to being a network SC, making the 
assumption of deterministic demand mostly infeasible. More research is required to 
investigate complex GSCs models with stochastic demand, dynamic rather than static 
networks, and asymmetric information (Keyvanshokooh et al., 2013; Lieckens and 
Vandaele, 2007; Niknejad and Petrovic, 2014; Pishvaee et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 
2014). Based on environmental, legal, social, and economic factors, reverse logistics 
and closed-loop supply chain issues have attracted attention among both academia 
and practitioners (Govindan et al., 2015; Khor et al., 2016). Reverse logistics 
operations and closed-loop SCs account for the reverse flow of materials or value 
from the final consumer to the producer (Haddadsisakht and Ryan, 2018; 
Rowshannahad et al., 2018). This process can be modeled as a remanufacturing 
process, i.e. rebuilding products to the specifications of the original manufactured 
products, using a combination of reused, repaired, and new parts (Johnson and 
McCarthy, 2014).  
The focus of reverse logistics could also include reducing energy use by creating a 
more efficient back-to-front process aimed at eliminating landfill of industrial 
products as much as possible (Guide Jr et al., 2000). Remanufacturing must not be 
confused with recycling. The former is responsible for the rebuilding/reusing of 
materials or components that have been recovered/recycled. 
The value derived from remanufacturing is observed when the performance or the 
expected life of the new product is insured, or can be quantified for the 
remanufacturing process. In recent decades, many studies have been conducted on the 
optimal pricing decisions of stakeholders related to SCM, particularly reverse 
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logistics and remanufacturing. 
We provide a brief review of this work, and especially studies dealing with the 
problem of pricing remanufactured products and recycled materials. Motivated by the 
real case of a company involved in the acquisition and remanufacture of used cell 
phones, Nikolaidis (2009) proposes a simple mathematical programming model to 
decide about the quantities to be purchased, and the quantities to be remanufactured.  
Based on two hypotheses related to the differential price of remanufactured 
products and new products, and differential price for recycling waste products, Zheng 
(2012) analyzes decentralized and centralized pricing models, and obtains an optimal 
pricing strategy for SC members. Xiong et al. (2014) propose a dynamic pricing 
policy for used products (cores) of uncertain quality. Chen (2016) proposes game 
models for different pricing strategies related to partial and direct reuse of scrapped 
automobiles recycled by a third-party recycler, and extend them to analyze the 
problem with a government subsidy for the third-party recycler. 
However, considering isolated activities or processes does not provide a holistic 
view of the GSC with environmentally-conscious customers, reverse logistics, and 
remanufacturing. In the GSC context, remanufacturing provides the customer with an 
opportunity to acquire a product that meets the original product standards but at a 
lower price than a completely new product (Jayaraman et al., 1999), with the 
remanufacturing companies dependent on customers returning used products (Östlin 
et al., 2008). In the same way that the price of the product affects customer demand, 
the acquisition price for used products affects the willingness of customers to transfer 
products and affects the quantities recycled. Work on acquisition pricing of used 
products is scarce (Keyvanshokooh et al., 2013), and the few existing studies tend to 
focus on the manufacturer. For example, they examine how the acquisition efforts of 
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manufacturers directly influence the strictly increasing, concave, and continuous core 
collection yield function (Lechner and Reimann, 2014). However, there are other 
drivers, such as customer’s environmental satisfaction, the effect on other customers 
of information being passed on about the buying experience, and the worker 
experience under learning and forgetting (Giri and Glock, 2017). Thus, the most 
important contribution of this paper is that it investigates the impact of 
environmentally-conscious customers and the word-of-mouth effect on the supply of 
the recyclable product, the willingness to transfer the used product, and the quantity 
recycled. This paper also discusses revenues and reverse logistics price changes 
according to the changes in key parameters which ultimately affect the reverse 
logistics pricing and the decisions of each stakeholder. 
 
3. Problem context 
3.1 Description of the green supply chain system  
Figure 1 depicts a GSC with a manufacturer, a retailer, and environmentally aware 
customers (Gu et al., 2005). In this system, the GSC recycles the products supplied in 
the market. The retailer is responsible for recycling used products from customers, the 
manufacturer obtains those recycled products from the retailer at a certain price, then 
remanufactures them, and sells the remanufactured products at the same price as a 
brand new  product, i.e. there is no difference in the price of the remanufactured 
product and the newly-manufactured product.  
The retailer evaluates the performance of the products before recycling. This 
guarantees that the recycled products can be fully reused by the manufacturer, and 
makes the manufacturer’s production costs lower for the remanufactured products. In 
order to encourage the retailer to recycle the product, the manufacture pays the retailer 
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at the price of 
mp  which is higher than price the retailer pays to the customer cp , 
representing a marginal profit rate of  . As already mentioned, the increase in 
customers’ environmental satisfaction is caused by the enterprises' green recycling 
practice, and can induce customers' to buy more products and to recycle more 
products. We assume sufficient market demand. 
 
The notations used in the rest of the paper are listed below: 
• Sets 
F Set of reverse logistics pricing decision strategies of the GCS; 
• Parameters 
0p  The final selling price of manufactured products; 
cp  The recycling price that the retailer pays to the customers; 
t  The fluctuation ratio of the CEA with the word-of-mouth effect, 10  t ; 
n  The number of customers in the GSC system; 
s  The total CEA of the GSC system; 
mC  The unit marginal production cost of remanufactured products; 
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Figure 1. Green supply chain system with a manufacturer, a retailer and 
environmentally-conscious customers 
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rC  The unit operating cost of retailers; 
0q  The supply of recyclable product without the impact of CEA; 
q  The supply of recyclable product with the impact of CEA; 
d  The conversion coefficient of the recyclable products; 
k  The price elasticity coefficient of the recyclable products; 
m  The manufacturer’s revenue; 
r  The retailer’s revenue; 
  The revenue from the reverse logistics system; 
• Variables 
mp  The recycling price that the manufacturer pays to the retailer; 
  The marginal profit rate that the retailer accepts based on the 
manufacturer’s commitment to recycle the items. 
3.2 Assumptions 
3.2.1 Customer’s environmental awareness and the word-of-mouth effect 
We consider the situation where one customer (the first person) is satisfied with the 
product he has purchased and passes on this information to another customer (the 
second person). It is most likely that the second person will choose to buy the same 
product as a result of the word-of-mouth effect (Ajorlou et al., 2016; Hervas-Drane, 
2015; Peluso et al., 2017). In this case, we assume that the recycling and 
remanufacturing efforts of enterprises increase customers’ environmental awareness 
and stimulate customers to buy more remanufactured products. Here, recycling and 
remanufacturing practices can be viewed as a special kind of service to satisfy 
customers’ psychological requirement for protection of the environment. The 
resulting customer psychological effect caused by this service is called CEA. The 
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CEA can be used to measure the degree of satisfaction of customers psychological 
requirement for protection of the environment, and the increased supply of recyclable 
products resulting.  
Hereafter, we denote the fluctuation ratio of customers' environmental awareness 
with the word-of-mouth effect as t , where 10  t , and the total CEA in the GSC 
system as s , which is a function of t . Suppose that the initial CEA of the first person 
is 1, then the second person’s CEA will be t , and the total CEA of the GSC system is 
an infinite sequence ( ) ( ),,, 21 1 ttt nn =

=
, with the sum of this infinite series 
t
t n
−
− +
1
1 1
, i.e. the GSC’s CEA is 
t
t
ts
n
−
−
=
+
1
1 1
)( . To simplify the analysis, suppose that 
the number of customers is sufficiently large, i.e. n → , then the total CEA of the 
GSC system can be written as 
t
ts
−
=
1
1
)( . 
 
3.2.2 Supply of recyclable product 
As mentioned in the literature review (c.f. Zheng, 2012; Xiong et al., 2014; Chen, 
2016), the reverse logistics pricing strategy will affect the supply of recyclable 
products and the demand for manufactured products and remanufactured products. 
Recycling markets are controlled by the same laws of supply and demand that 
control other markets. In the case of supply of recyclable products, we assume here 
that it is determined mainly by the recycling price that the retailer pays to customers 
(denoted cp ). We investigated the shape of the supply curves for the normal product 
and the recyclable product. We found the curves for the recyclable product are more 
fitted to the exponential function, given a period of time and without considering other 
elements. Thus, the supply of recyclable product can be expressed as: 
( ) kcc dppfq ==
0
      (1) 
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where, k  is the price elasticity coefficient of the recyclable products, d  is the 
conversion coefficient, and 0,1  dk  (Lau and Lau, 2003). 
When the impact of CEA is considered, the final result of the supply of recyclable 
products can be expressed as： 
k
c
k
c
k
c dp
t
t
dpdp
t
qtsq
−
+=
−
==
11
10
)(      (2) 
where, 
k
cdp
t
t
−1
 represents the increased supply due to the increase in CEA. 
3.2.3 Manufacturer’s and retailer’s revenues and the reverse logistics system 
As assumed above, the number of customers is sufficiently large, i.e. n →  or the 
market of this GSC system would be unlimited, so the retail price is set by the retailer 
as a fixed price that is not subject to bargaining, and is denoted 0p . 
The recycling price paid by the manufacturer to the retailer is denoted mp , and is 
assumed to be related to cp , and can be written as: 
( )1c mp p= −        (3) 
where   is the marginal profit rate that the retailer accepts based on the 
manufacturer’s commitment to recycle the items, which is the decision variable of the 
retailer within 10   . 
In this paper, the revenue of the stakeholders in the GCS is limited to the reverse 
logistics, i.e. the revenue of the manufacturer is a composite of the recycling costs and 
the production costs of the recyclable products, and the income from the sale of these 
products. The retailer’s revenue is a composite of the cost of recycling and the income 
from selling the recycled products. Based on the above hypothesis and analysis, for 
given recycling prices of mp  and cp , the manufacturer’s revenue can be expressed 
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as: 
( ) ( ) ( )mm
k
m
kk
cmmm pCpp
t
d
dp
t
pCp −−−
−
=
−
−−= 00 1
11
1
   (4) 
The retailer’s revenue can be expressed as: 
( ) ( ) ( )rm
k
m
kk
ccrmr Cpp
t
d
dp
t
pCp −−
−
=
−
−−= 1
11
1    (5) 
The revenue fo the reverse logistics system can be expressed as: 
( ) ( ) mmr
k
m
k
rm pCCpp
t
d
 −−−−−
−
=+= 11
1
0
  (6) 
 
3.4 Decision strategy in the reverse logistics system 
Here, the solution of ( ),mp  is defined as a decision strategy of the reverse logistics 
system (i.e. the solution of the three game models discussed in the next section). In 
order to simplify the following analysis, Lemma 1 is proposed as: 
Lemma 1: When ( ) mmm CppCp
k
k
−−
+
−
00
1
1 , 
)1(
)1(2
+
−+

kp
kCp
p
C
m
rm
m
r  , 1) m  is a 
concave function of mp ; 2) r  is a concave function of  ; and 3)   is a concave 
function of ( ),mp , as ( ) ( ) rmmrm CCppCCp
k
k
−−−−
+
00 1-
1
  is also satisfied.  
Lemma 1 indicates that only if ( ) Fpm ,  holds, does the decision strategy cause 
a reverse for each stakeholder in the reverse logistics system, otherwise, there is no 
reverse for the stakeholders, or the reverse will decrease due to the decrease in the 
quantity recycled. 
Then the set of decision strategies can be represented as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )






−−−−
++
−+
−−
+
−
= rmmrm
m
rm
m
r
mmmm CCppCCp
k
k
kp
kCp
p
C
CppCp
k
k
pF 0000 1-
1
，
1
12
1
1

)(
)(
,|,  (7) 
4. Game models for reverse logistics system with CEA 
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4.1 Non-cooperative pricing scenario 
4.1.1 Stackelberg equilibrium (S-model) 
In this model, the manufacturer and the retailer are part of a sequential 
non-cooperative game. In this game, the manufacturer plays a dominant role as the 
leader, and the retailer is the follower, i.e. this is a Stackelberg game model. In this 
game, the manufacturer sets the reverse logistics pricing decision based on market 
price information, and the retailer subsequently makes its own reverse logistics 
pricing decision after acknowledging the manufacturer's reverse logistics pricing 
decision. Following these decisions, the retailer recycles the used products from 
customers at a given price 
cp , and the manufacturer buys the recycled products from 
the retailer at a given price 
mp . 
In figuring out the solutions to Stackelberg equilibrium equations, the aim is to 
acquire the corresponding function of the second stage. That is, the retailer pursues 
maximum revenue based on the information about the pricing decisions made by the 
manufacturer. According to Lemma 1, 
r  is a concave function of  , and, the 
optimal decision variable *  can be derived by solving the first order condition of 
r  for the maximum revenue, 0= r , i.e.  
( ) ( ) ( )  011
1
1
=−−−−
−
=

 −
rmm
kk
m
r Cpkpp
t
d


 
Then the optimal decision variable *  can be written as: 
( )
*
1
m r
m
p kC
p k

+
=
+
        (8) 
Eq.(8) illustrates the optimal decision of the retailer when the recycling price mp  
has been given by the manufacturer, i.e. the retailer should bargain over the optimal 
marginal profit rate offered by the manufacturer, and sets its recycling pricing cp  to 
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obtain the maximum revenue.  
Put Eq.(8) into the revenue function of the manufacturer, i.e. Eq.(4), and the 
revenue function can be addressed as:  
( )  mm
k
rm
k
m pCpCp
k
k
t
d
−−−





+−
= 0
11
   (9) 
According to Lemma 1, m  is a concave function of mp , and the optimal 
decision variable mp  can be derived by solving the first order condition of m  for 
the maximum revenue, 0= mm p , i.e.  
( )    0
11
0
1
=+−−−−





+−
=

 −
rmmm
k
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k
m
m CppCpkCp
k
k
t
d
p
 
Then the optimal decision variable 
*
mp  can be written as: 
( )
1
0
+
+−
=
k
CCpk
p rmm
*        (10) 
and the solution to the S-model can be written as: 
( ) ( )
( ) 
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1
,, **     (11) 
Then, the revenues of the manufacturer, the retailer and the reverse logistics system 
can be written as: 
  1012
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4.1.2 Nash equilibrium (N-model) 
The rapid development of modern large retailers such as Wal-Mart and Carrefour, is 
bringing retailers closer to customers in the SC than manufacturers. The retailer plays 
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an increasingly important role especially in the reverse logistics system, and is an 
agent between the manufacturer and customers. 
Given the increased status of the retailer in the SC, and in the context of reverse 
logistics, this paper assumes that neither the manufacturer nor the retailer is dominant; 
instead, they make decisions independently, impartially, and simultaneously within a 
static Nash game. The solution to this model is Nash equilibrium. 
In this case, the problem is the maximum of the manufacturer's and the retailer’s 
revenue. 
The manufacturer's maximum revenue can be expressed as: 
( ) ( )
( ) mmm
mm
k
m
k
m
p
CppCp
k
k
ts
pCpp
t
d
m
−−
+
−
−−−
−
=
00
0
1
1
1
1
..
max 
    (15) 
The retailer's maximum revenue can be expressed as: 
( ) ( )max 1
1
2 ( 1)
. .
( 1)
k k
r m m r
m rr
m m
d
p p C
t
p C kC
s t
p p k

 

 = − −
−
+ −
 
+
    (16) 
The solution to the N-model is obtained from the following first order conditions: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 


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The solution to the N-model can be written as: 
( ) ( ) 


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−
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Then, the revenues of the manufacturer, the retailer, and the reverse logistics system 
can be written as: 
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4.2 Joint pricing scenario (J-model) 
The cooperation game model is the kind of game model in which players make 
decisions together to create a surplus of cooperation in a context of 
information-sharing, with the purpose of maximizing the total revenue of the reverse 
logistics system. In the reverse logistics system in this subsection, the manufacturer 
and the retailer make their decisions jointly. According to Lemma 1   is a concave 
function of ( ),mp , the model in this Joint pricing scenario becomes a 
double-variable optimization as follows: 
( ) ( ) 
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The solution to the J-model can be obtained from the following first order 
condition: 
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The solution to the J-model can be written as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )*** *** *** *** *** ***0, | 1- , ,
1
m m m r m
k
J p p p C C p F
k
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 
= = − −  
+ 
  (22) 
Then, the revenue of the reverse logistics system can be expressed as: 
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5. Simulation case study 
5.1 Typical model results 
In this section, we propose a numerical example to illustrate some important 
characteristics of the above results. The main parameters are subjected to 
comprehensive sensitivity analysis to investigate the behavior of the models. Similar 
to previous literature in this area (Gan et al., 2017, 2015; Gönsch, 2015), the values of 
the parameters are as follows: 
 
100 =p , 53.=mC , 1=rC , 1000=d , 80.=t , 2=k  
Table 1 shows the results with above parameter values, including the revenues of 
the manufacturer, the retailer, and the reverse logistics system, the recycling price that 
the retailer pays to customers, and the quantity of recycled products. 
It can be observed that the J-model yields the best results for the reverse logistic 
system revenue, the recycling price, and quantity of recycled material. The S-model 
shows a higher recycling price and higher quantity of recycled material, and higher 
system revenue compared to the N-model.  
Table 1 the results of the models in the simulation case 
 Revenue ($) Recycling price of 
retailer ($) 
Quantity of 
recycled items Manufacturer Retailer System 
S-model 54774 36516 91290 2.444 29876 
N-model 53498 27435 80933 2.222 24691 
J-model   123240 3.667 67222 
 
5.2 Managerial insights and sensitivity analyses 
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This section discusses the effects of changes in the model’s main parameters on the 
revenues of the manufacturer, the retailer, and the reverse logistics system, the 
retailer’s recycling price, and the quantity of recycled product. It analyzes the 
combined effect of multiple parameters. 
 
5.2.1 The fluctuation ratio of the CEA ( t ) 
In discussing the fluctuation ratio of the CEA ( t ),the other parameters are the same as 
in section 5.1 with the exception of the fluctuation ratio of the CEA ( )10,t . 
• Insight 1 Revenue changes according to the fluctuation ratio variation 
Graphs 1) and 2) in Figure 2 show the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s revenue 
changes. In both cases, these revenues increase with an increasing t . The 
manufacturer’s and the retailer’s revenues in the S-model are larger than in the 
N-model when t  evolves from the start point, i.e. 0=t . Graph 3) in Figure 2 shows 
the changes to the revenue of the total reverse logistics system in the non-cooperative 
pricing scenario (S-model and N-model) and the joint pricing scenario (J-model). The 
total reverse logistics system revenue increases with an increasing t , and the 
relationship of the system revenue in these three models is: J-model > S-model > 
N-model. The results presented in Table 1 confirm this. It can be observed that raising 
the fluctuation ratio t  encourages all the members of the SC to conduct greener 
production methods, to promote environmental awareness among customers, and to 
make decisions cooperatively to achieve a higher system revenue. 
As customers’ environmental consciousness increases, CEA will have a greater 
impact on the revenue of all SC members and the SC system, especially in this 
simulation case study when 80.t , and there are sharp increases in each curve. The 
stakeholders in the GSC should cooperate to make the product greener. If stakeholders 
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make their decisions independently, this will result in lower stakeholder revenue and 
lower system revenue. 
• Insight 2 Quantity of recycled material changes with the fluctuation ratio 
variation 
Figure 3 shows that the quantity of recycled materials differ for the SC system in the 
two non-cooperative pricing and the joint pricing models. The quantity of recycled 
material increases with a rising t , and the relationship of this quantity in the three 
models is: J-model> S-model > N-model. The results presented in Table 1 confirm this 
indication. 
 
 
1) manufacturer 
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    2) retailer        3) total reverse logistics system 
Figure 2. Revenue changes according to the fluctuation ratio rising 
 
 
Figure 3. Quantity of recycled material changes according to the increase in the fluctuation ratio 
 
 
It can be seen that a rise in the fluctuation ratio t  encourages more customers to 
sell used products to the retailer. The quantity of recycled products is higher if the SC 
members make their decisions cooperatively. 
5.2.2 The price elasticity coefficient of the recycled products ( k ) 
In the discussion of the price elasticity coefficient of the recycled products ( k ),the 
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parameters are the same as those in section 5.1 with the exception of the price 
elasticity coefficient of the recycled products ( )1,5k . 
• Insight 3 Revenue changes according to the price elasticity coefficient k  
Graphs 1) and 2) in Figure 4 show the revenue changes for the manufacturer and the 
retailer in the non-cooperative pricing scenario (S-model and N-model). The revenues 
of the manufacturer and the retailer both increase with an increasing k . The 
manufacturer’s and the retailer’s revenues are larger in the S-model compared to 
N-model when ( )1,5k . In Graph 3), the total reverse logistics system revenues in 
the S-model and N-model show the same changes as the manufacturer’s and the 
retailer’s revenues which increase with an increasing k . In the J-model in the joint 
pricing scenario, the total system revenue is always larger than in the other two 
models. It can be seen that raising the price elasticity coefficient k  encourages all 
members of the SC to produce a more price sensitive product, to gain more revenue, 
and to make decisions cooperatively which is in line with Zhu et al. (2010). 
As customers’ become more price sensitive, improving the product’s price 
elasticity coefficient k  will have a greater impact on the revenues of all SC 
members and the system, especially in this simulation case study when 4k , and 
there are sharp increases in each curve. The stakeholders in GSC should cooperate to 
make the product more price elastic. If stakeholders decide independently, this will 
result in lower stakeholder and system revenues. 
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1) manufacturer        2) retailer 
 
 
 
3) total reverse logistics system 
Figure 4. Revenue changes according to the price elasticity coefficient k  
 
• Insight 4 Quantity of recycled product changes with the price elasticity coefficient k  
Figure 5 shows that the quantity of recycled product in all three models increases with 
a rising k , and the relationship of the quantity in these three models is: J-model > 
S-model > N-model. Similar to the impact of the fluctuation ratio variation on the 
quantity of recycled product, it can be observed that raising the price elasticity 
coefficient k  encourages more customers to sell used products to the retailer, and if 
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all members of the SC make decisions in cooperation as shown in the curve of the 
J-model this results in a higher volume of recycled products. 
Given the fixed retail price 0p , it can be observed that raising the price elasticity 
coefficient k  encourages more customers to sell used products to the retailer. If  all 
the members of the SC make their decisions cooperatively this results in a higher 
quantity of recycled products. 
 
 
Figure 5. Quantity of recycled changes according to k  
 
• Insight 5 Recycling price changes according to the price elasticity coefficient k  
Figure 6 shows that the recycling price increases with a rising k , and the relationship 
of the price in these three models is: J-model> S-model > N-model. It can be observed 
that raising the price elasticity coefficient k  encourages the retailer to set a higher 
recycling price for customers, and helps to set a higher price if all members of the SC 
make decisions in cooperation. 
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Figure 6. Recycling price changes according k  
 
5.2.3 The combined effect of t  and k  and the unit marginal production cost of 
remanufactured products ( mC ) 
In this discussion of the combined effect of t  and k , the other parameters are the 
same as in section 5.1 with the exception of the values of t  and k , where ( )10,t  
and ( )51,k  . 
• Insight 6 Revenue changes according to t  and k  
• Insight 7 Quantity of recycled changes according to t  and k . 
 
With regards to the unit marginal production cost of remanufactured products ( mC ), 
the parameters are the same as those in section 5.1 with the exception of the unit 
marginal production cost of remanufactured products ( )1,10mC  .  
• Insight 8 Revenue changes according to the unit marginal production cost of 
remanufactured mC  
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Graphs 1) and 2) in Figure 7 show that the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s revenues 
decrease with an increasing mC . Initially, the manufacturer’s revenue in the S-model 
is larger than in the N-model, while with an increasing mC , the manufacturer’s 
revenue in the S-model reduces faster, and less than in N-model. The revenue of the 
retailer in the S-model is always higher than in the N-model. In Graph 3) the 
relationship of the total reverse logistics system revenues in these three models 
initially is J-model> S-model > N-model but with an increasing mC , the system 
revenue in the J-model reduces more quickly but less than in the N-model or the 
S-model; the revenue in the S-model is always higher than in the N-model.  
 
 
1) manufacturer 
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2) retailer 
 
        3) total reverse logistics system 
Figure 7. Revenue changes according to mC  
 
It can be seen raising the unit marginal production cost of the remanufactured 
product mC  results in a revenue decrease for the members of the SC and the system, 
and that improving the production technology and reducing the unit marginal 
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production cost of the remanufactured product maintains the revenue at an acceptable 
level. If the price of the unit marginal production cost of remanufactured product is 
kept at a low level, it is better for the stakeholders to make their pricing and 
manufacturing decision cooperatively which would result also in a higher system 
revenue. 
• Insight 9 Quantity of recycled changes with the unit marginal production cost of 
remanufactured 
Figure 8 shows the quantity of recycled product decreases with a rising mC , and the 
relationship of the quantity in these three models initially is J-model > S-model > 
N-model  but is increasing with mC , the system revenue in the J-model and S-model 
falls more quickly but less than in the N-model, and revenue in the J-model is always 
higher than in the S-model.  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Quantity of recycled changes according to mC  
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It can be seen that raising the unit marginal production cost of remanufactured mC  
reduces the amount of remanufactured product, results in a lower volume of the 
recycled product, and a lower recycling price for the retailer. If all the members of the 
SC make their decisions cooperatively this results in a bigger amount of recycled 
product if the unit marginal production cost of the remanufactured product is kept 
reasonably low. 
• Insight 10 Recycling price changes according to the unit marginal production 
cost of remanufactured 
Figure 9 shows the recycling price changes for the retailer in the non-cooperative 
pricing scenario and joint pricing scenario (S-model, N-model and J-model). The 
recycling price decreases with a rising mC , and the relationship of the price in these 
three models initially is J-model> S-model > N-model at first, but with an increasing 
mC , the system revenue in the J-model reduces more quickly but less than in the 
N-model and S-model although the revenue in the S-model is always higher than in the 
N-model.  
It can be seen that raising mC  constrains the retailer from setting a higher 
recycling price for customers but helps to set a reasonable price if the members of the 
SC make their decisions cooperatively. 
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Figure 9. Recycling price changes according to mC  
 
As emerged from the literature review, there is a growing attention to reverse 
logistics issues. This is due to the rising awareness of the importance of managerial 
practices for supply chain sustainability and to institutional and regulatory pressures. 
Overall, our models highlight the relevance of aligned goals and cooperation 
along the SC. First, our study points to the collective utility of the reverse logistics 
system as we highlight the positive effects of CEA and recycled products for the 
supply chain as a whole. Second, we point to the advantage for stakeholders, to 
cooperate for setting pricing and manufacturing decisions. We show that independent 
decisions lead to lower stakeholder and system revenues. 
Managers can learn from the proposed models that promoting environmental 
awareness among customers and pursuing cooperatively decision making along the 
SC lead to higher system revenue. Cooperation should be fostered at all stages of the 
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SC to make the product greener which in turn lead to a more sustainable SC. 
Specifically, the volume of recycled products increases as all members of the SC 
cooperate by selling used products. Managers can also achieve a better understanding 
of the implications of producing a more price sensitive product for a better revenue.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper focused on a reverse logistics pricing strategy in a GSC with 
environmentally-conscious customers in markets that lead to increased amounts of 
used product, and encourage GSC firms to manufacture greener and more sustainable 
products. The revenue functions of GSC members were formulated considering the 
increased supply of used product due to the increase in CEA, and solving them for the 
optimal solutions for GSCs’ members in J-model, S-model and N-model of the 
non-cooperative pricing scenario and joint pricing scenario. We applied numerical 
sensitivity analyses to the effects of the fluctuation ratio of the CEA changes, the price 
elasticity coefficient of the recycled product changes, and the unit marginal 
production cost of remanufactured products, on the revenues of GSC stakeholders and 
their decisions about environmental pollution and sustainability. 
We observed that increasing the effects of the fluctuation ratio of the CEA and the 
price elasticity coefficient of the recycled products to a certain threshold, leads to 
increases in the supply and the prices of the used product, and increases in the 
revenues of all GSC members. We observe also that an increase in the unit marginal 
production cost of remanufactured product leads to a decrease in the quantity of 
recycled product, the price of the recycled product, and the revenues of all GSC 
members. From a  holistic perspective, it is better for stakeholders to make their 
pricing and manufacturing decisions jointly which would lead to a higher level of 
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revenue and quantity of recycled product. 
Although this study contributes to the GSC management literature, its models are 
restricted to a typical reverse logistics operational scenario without new-manufactured 
products, in which the profit derived from selling the product is excluded from the 
retailer’s revenue. It would be interesting to generalize the models to more than two 
types of products (new-manufactured and re-manufactured), and to extend the 
scenarios to include a closed-loop reverse SC. In the present study, the product’s retail 
price is assumed to be fixed, and the impact of the CEA fluctuation ratio on market 
demand is not considered. This study could be improved by including the impacts of 
the retail price and the CEA fluctuation ratio on market demand. A final suggestion for 
further research would be to consider  incorporating governmental subsidies and 
intervention in cording the green supply chain.. 
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Appendix A 
Proof of 1) m  is a concave function of mp . 
Note that the variables mp  and   are non-negative and independent of each other. 
According to Eq.(4), the first-order and the second-order derivatives of m  with 
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respect to mp  are as follows. 
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Using Eq. (A.1), we find that 
m  is concave in mp  when ( )mm Cp
k
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+
−
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1
. 
For the GSC system, it is obvious that 0m  which guarantees that the 
manufacturer can make a profit. So, 
mm pCp −0 . Then the value range of mp  
can be addressed as: 
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Proof of 2) r  is a concave function of  . 
According to Eq.(5), the first-order and the second-order derivatives of 
r  with 
respect to   are as follows. 
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Using Eq. (A.2), we find that 
m  is concave in   when 
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m
rm . 
For the GSC system, it is obvious that 0  which guarantees that the retailer 
can make a profit. So, 0− rm Cp . Then the value range of   can be written as: 
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Proof of 3)   is a concave function of ( ),mp .  
Note that the variables 
mp  and   are non-negative and independent of each other. 
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According to Eq.(6), the first-order partial derivatives of   with respect to mp  and 
  are as follows. 
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and the second-order partial derivatives of   with respect to mp  and   can 
be written as. 
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Note 
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For the GSC system, it is obvious that 0  which guarantees that the GSC 
system can make a profit. So, ( ) rmm CCpp −−− 01  . Given that 1k  and 
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feasible value range of ( ) mp−1  can be expressed as Eq.(6) and is depicted in 
Figure A.1. 
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Figure A.1 the analysis of the value range of ( ) mp−1  
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